πŸ”’ Security & Audits
Test Coverage

Test Coverage & Security Validation

Last Updated: January 16, 2026
Version: v2.4.0
Status: βœ… Passing (production-ready)

Test Statistics

Overview

  • Total Tests: 950 (753 Hardhat + 181 Foundry + 12 Echidna + 4 Manticore)
  • Hardhat Tests: 34 test files (753 individual tests)
  • Foundry Tests: 181 tests (including 17 fuzz suites)
  • Echidna Properties: 12 invariants
  • Manticore Symbolic Tests: 4 tests
  • Success Rate: 100%
  • Fuzzing Runs: 1,940,000+

Advanced Security Tests

  • SEAL360Token: 11 advanced tests (economic attacks)
  • S360StakingRewards: 14 advanced tests (gaming prevention)
  • Total Advanced: 25 tests (real-world attack scenarios)

New Security Tests (Jan 13, 2026)

S360Treasury (16 Tests)

Complete financial security validation covering:

  • Fee reception and authorization
  • Treasury spending controls
  • Multi-category fee tracking
  • Purpose-based spending transparency
  • Financial summary validation
  • Real-time balance invariants

Coverage: 0% β†’ ~60%

S360MultiSigTimelock (22 CRITICAL Tests)

Comprehensive governance security testing:

  • βœ… Timelock delay enforcement (1/2/3/7 days)
  • βœ… Multi-signature 3/5 confirmations
  • βœ… 60% threshold validation
  • βœ… Operation expiry (30 days)
  • βœ… Emergency pause mechanism (100 votes)
  • βœ… Confirmation/revocation tracking

Coverage: 0% β†’ ~70%

Security Features Validated

Multi-Signature Protection

  • 3 of 5 signatures required for any operation
  • 60% minimum threshold enforced
  • Prevents single-key compromise attacks

Timelock System

  • Risk-based delays:
    • LOW: 1 day (parameter tweaks)
    • MEDIUM: 2 days (contract upgrades)
    • HIGH: 3 days (token economics)
    • CRITICAL: 7 days (governance changes)

Emergency Mechanisms

  • 100 community votes can trigger pause
  • Blocks all new proposals and executions
  • Any signer can investigate and lift pause

Operation Lifecycle

  • 30-day auto-expiry prevents stale proposals
  • Cannot execute cancelled operations
  • Confirmation revocation supported

Static Analysis Tools

Slither v0.11.3

  • Status: βœ… Operational
  • Issues Found: 0 high/medium
  • Contracts Analyzed: All production contracts

Mythril v0.24.8

  • Status: βœ… Complete
  • Vulnerabilities: 0
  • Contracts Analyzed: 6 core contracts

Fuzzing Results

Configuration

  • Runs per test: 10,000
  • Total fuzzing runs: 1,210,000+
  • Edge cases tested: Zero addresses, max values, boundaries

Results

  • Critical issues: 0
  • High severity: 0
  • Medium severity: 0
  • Authorization bypasses: 0
  • Reentrancy issues: 0

Coverage by Contract

ContractCoverageTestsStatus
S360Vesting~87%14βœ… Excellent
S360MultiSigTimelock~70%22βœ… Good
S360BondingCurve~64%15βœ… Good
S360Treasury~60%16βœ… Good
SEAL360Token~60%11βœ… Good
S360TimeVaultRND~59%7βœ… Good
S360StakingRewards~57%16βœ… Good
S360Governor~42%11🟑 Acceptable

Attack Vectors Mitigated

Treasury Security

  • βœ… Unauthorized fee injection
  • βœ… Over-spending attacks
  • βœ… Fund burning
  • βœ… Accounting manipulation

Governance Security

  • βœ… Instant malicious execution
  • βœ… Single key compromise
  • βœ… Minority control
  • βœ… Stale proposal execution
  • βœ… Vote manipulation

Next Steps

  1. βœ… Deploy to Fuji testnet
  2. βœ… Monitor for 1-2 weeks
  3. ⏳ External security audit
  4. ⏳ Bug bounty program
  5. ⏳ Mainnet deployment

Resources


πŸ”₯ Advanced Security Tests (NEW)

What Makes These Tests "Advanced"?

Unlike basic tests that check "can user do X?", advanced tests validate:

  • Economic attacks: Flash loans, MEV, front-running
  • Gaming attacks: Reward manipulation, dilution, last-second stakes
  • Timing attacks: Multi-block scenarios, race conditions
  • Multi-user competition: Complex interactions between users
  • State manipulation: Blacklist timing, pause exploitation

SEAL360Token Advanced Tests (11 tests)

Complex Multi-User Scenarios

  1. Circular Transfer Pattern (A→B→C→A)

    • Validates balance conservation in circular transfers
    • Tests: Multiple rounds, different amounts
    • Result: Total supply always constant βœ…
  2. Concurrent Approvals and transferFrom

    • Multiple spenders approved simultaneously
    • Concurrent spending from same source
    • Result: Allowances tracked correctly βœ…
  3. Mass Transfer (1-to-many)

    • Single sender to 10+ recipients
    • Different amounts per recipient
    • Result: Conservation of tokens maintained βœ…
  4. Transfer Chain (up to 20 hops)

    • Long chains of transfers Aβ†’Bβ†’Cβ†’...
    • Variable chain lengths
    • Result: Conservation holds regardless of length βœ…

Economic Attack Scenarios

  1. Flash Loan Price Manipulation

    • Attacker borrows 100M tokens
    • Tries to manipulate state
    • Result: Must return + fee, manipulation prevented βœ…
  2. Approval Front-Running Attack

    • Alice changes approval, Bob front-runs
    • Bob spends old approval first
    • Result: Expected behavior (use increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance) βœ…
  3. Dust Attack (100 addresses)

    • Attacker sends 1 wei to 100 addresses
    • Attempts to spam and break accounting
    • Result: Accounting remains accurate βœ…

Blacklist Advanced Scenarios

  1. Blacklist Cascade Protection

    • Alice blacklisted with existing approvals
    • Bob cannot use Alice's tokens
    • Charlie cannot receive from Alice
    • Result: Blacklist is comprehensive βœ…
  2. Blacklist Timing Attack

    • Alice has large approval to Bob
    • Admin blacklists Alice
    • Bob tries to extract quickly
    • Result: Blacklist is immediate βœ…

Pause & State Scenarios

  1. Pause During Complex Operation
    • Alice approves Bob (step 1)
    • Contract paused (step 2)
    • Bob tries to use approval (should fail)
    • Unpause and complete operation
    • Result: Pause effective immediately βœ…

Critical Invariants

  1. Sum of Balances = Total Supply
    • After multiple complex operations
    • Validates conservation of tokens
    • Result: Always holds true βœ…

S360StakingRewards Advanced Tests (14 tests)

Reward Gaming Attacks

  1. Last-Second Stake Gaming

    • Alice stakes for 29 days (1M tokens)
    • Attacker stakes 10M tokens at last second
    • Alice should still earn most rewards (time-weighted)
    • Result: Alice earns 100x more than attacker βœ…
  2. Stake-Unstake-Restake Cycling

    • Alice stakes normally for 15 days
    • Attacker cycles: stake β†’ wait 1 day β†’ withdraw β†’ repeat 10x
    • Alice should earn more (consistent staking)
    • Result: Gaming attack not profitable βœ…
  3. Whale Front-Running Reward Notification

    • Alice stakes small amount first
    • Whale sees new rewards coming, front-runs with massive stake
    • New rewards added
    • Whale withdraws
    • Result: Alice still gets proportional early rewards βœ…
  4. Massive Stake Dilution Attack

    • Alice stakes and earns for 15 days
    • Whale stakes 90M tokens (massive)
    • Alice's past rewards should NOT be diluted
    • Result: Past rewards protected, only future diluted βœ…

Timing Attacks

  1. Staking After Period Ends

    • Reward period completes
    • Attacker stakes after period
    • Waits 10 days
    • Result: Earns nothing (period ended) βœ…
  2. Withdraw-Restake Timing

    • Alice stakes, earns for 10 days
    • Alice withdraws all
    • Alice immediately restakes
    • Result: Unclaimed rewards preserved βœ…

Multi-User Competition

  1. Fair Reward Distribution (Time-Weighted)

    • Alice stakes at day 0 (30 days)
    • Bob stakes at day 10 (20 days)
    • Charlie stakes at day 20 (10 days)
    • Result: Alice:Bob:Charlie β‰ˆ 3:2:1 (time-weighted) βœ…
  2. Mass Exit Doesn't Affect Remaining

    • 10 users stake equally
    • Also Alice stakes
    • Alice's earnings at midpoint recorded
    • 9 users mass exit
    • Result: Alice earns MORE after exit (less competition) βœ…

Economic Edge Cases

  1. Minimum Stake Enforcement

    • Below minimum: Reverts βœ…
    • Exactly minimum: Works βœ…
    • Result: Boundary validation correct βœ…
  2. Tiny Stakes Still Earn Proportionally

    • Alice stakes minimum (100 tokens)
    • Bob stakes 10M tokens
    • Result: Alice still earns something (proportional) βœ…
  3. Reward Exhaustion

    • Alice stakes alone
    • Full period passes
    • Alice claims all rewards
    • Result: Can exhaust all rewards (~1M tokens) βœ…

Critical Invariants

  1. Total Staked < Token Supply

    • After all operations
    • Result: Never exceeds token supply βœ…
  2. Sum of User Balances = Total Supply

    • Multiple users stake
    • Result: Sum always equals totalSupply βœ…
  3. Earned Never Exceeds Available

    • User earns rewards
    • Full period passes
    • Result: Earned ≀ contract balance βœ…

πŸ“Š Attack Vector Coverage

Economic Attacks

Attack TypeTestsMitigation
Flash Loan Manipulation2Fee makes unprofitable
Front-Running3Time-weighted rewards, fees
Reward Gaming4Time-weighted distribution
Dilution Attacks2Past rewards protected
Sandwich Attacks1Pending (BondingCurve)

Timing Attacks

Attack TypeTestsMitigation
Last-Second Stakes2Time-weighted rewards
Blacklist Timing2Immediate effect
Pause Exploitation1Blocks all operations
Withdraw-Restake1Unclaimed preserved

Gaming Attacks

Attack TypeTestsMitigation
Stake Cycling2Not more profitable
Mass Exit1Doesn't harm others
Dust Attacks1Accounting intact
Approval Manipulation1Use safe methods

🎯 Test Quality Comparison

Basic vs Advanced Tests

AspectBasic TestsAdvanced Tests
Focus"Can do X?""Can break system?"
UsersSingle userMulti-user competitive
TimingSequentialFront-running, MEV
EconomicsStatic valuesGaming, manipulation
ScenariosHappy pathAttack vectors

Example Comparison

Basic Test:

function testCanStake() public {
    staking.stake(100);
    assertEq(staking.balanceOf(user), 100);
}

Advanced Test:

function testAdvanced_LastSecondStakeDoesNotStealRewards() public {
    // Alice stakes for 29 days
    alice.stake(1_000_000);
    vm.warp(block.timestamp + 29 days);
    
    // Attacker stakes huge at last second
    attacker.stake(10_000_000);
    vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1 days);
    
    // Alice should have earned most (time-weighted)
    uint256 aliceRewards = staking.earned(alice);
    uint256 attackerRewards = staking.earned(attacker);
    
    assertTrue(aliceRewards > attackerRewards * 100);
}