πŸ”’ Security & Audits
Overview

πŸ›‘οΈ Security Overview

SEAL360 v3.0 DIAMOND is built with defense-in-depth and continuous verification. This page reflects the actual deployed contracts and the latest security results.

Last Updated: February 8, 2026
Deployment: Avalanche Fuji Testnet
Version: v3.0 DIAMOND πŸ’Ž
Primary Audit Tool: Slither (Consensys)


βœ… Security Score (Real)

MetricValueStatus
Security Score88/100βœ… Production Ready
Slither Analysis0 Critical / 0 High / 0 Mediumβœ… Clean
Custom Code Findings0βœ… Clean
OpenZeppelin Findings3 (expected)βœ… Acknowledged
Reentrancy ProtectionCritical paths protectedβœ… Enforced

Note: SolidityScan reported false positives. Slither + manual review confirm production readiness.


πŸ›‘οΈ Defense in Depth (7 Layers)

LAYER 7: Post-Launch Monitoring
         └─ Alerts + Analytics dashboards
              ↓
LAYER 6: Access Control
         └─ AccessControl (7 roles) + Ownable2Step where applicable
              ↓
LAYER 5: Circuit Breakers
         └─ Pausable + Emergency multisig (β‰₯60% signers)
              ↓
LAYER 4: Rate Limiting
         └─ Anti-bot + Max TX/Max Wallet
              ↓
LAYER 3: Reentrancy Protection
         └─ ReentrancyGuard on critical functions
              ↓
LAYER 2: Input Validation
         └─ require + custom errors
              ↓
LAYER 1: Static Analysis + Review
         └─ Slither + manual review

Slither Results (v3.0 DIAMOND)

Critical: 0
High:     0
Medium:   0
Low:      Informational only

Acknowledged (OpenZeppelin base contracts):

  • Governor._executeOperations() can send ETH (by design)
  • Governor.relay() can send ETH (by design)
  • TimelockController._execute() can send ETH (required)

Reentrancy Protection (Critical Paths)

ContractProtected FunctionsModifier
SEAL360Token_DIAMONDflashLoan()nonReentrant
S360StakingRewardsWithLockstake(), withdraw(), claimRewards(), emergencyWithdraw()nonReentrant
S360BondingCurvebuyTokens(), sellTokens(), withdrawFees()nonReentrant
S360FeeDistributiondistributeFees()nonReentrant
S360LiquidityManagercritical liquidity opsnonReentrant
S360RewardDistributorreward distributionnonReentrant
S360EcosystemFundgrant executionnonReentrant
S360TimelockControllerexecuteEmergency()nonReentrant
S360MultiSigTimelockexecute()nonReentrant

Flash Loan Protection (ERC-3156)

  • Fee: 0.09% (9 bps)
  • Minimum: 1,000 S360
  • Max: Total supply
  • ReentrancyGuard enforced

Economic outcome: Flash loan attacks are unprofitable by design.


Emergency Controls

Emergency Multisig

  • Threshold: β‰₯60% of signers
  • Timelock: 1–7 days (by risk level)
  • Bypass: Emergency only, whitelisted actions

Timelock Controller (v3.0)

  • Risk-tiered delays: 1d / 2d / 3d / 7d
  • Emergency bypass with 4/7 approvals
  • Whitelist enforced for emergency calls

External Audit Status

Planned Q1 2026

  • Auditor: TBD (CertiK / Quantstamp / Trail of Bits)
  • Scope: All 13 production contracts
  • Report: Public

Bug Bounty (Planned)

  • Platform: Immunefi (Q2 2026)
  • Funded by: Growth Fund

Security Resources


Next Steps