π° Economic Security
SEAL360's economic model is designed to resist manipulation, attacks, and exploitation through multiple layers of protection.
Core Economic Protections
1. Flash Loan Protection
Threat: Attackers borrowing massive amounts of tokens to manipulate governance or rewards.
Protection:
- β Flash loan protection mechanisms active
- β 1.08M S360 per-block trading limit (prevents flash loan attacks)
- β Flash-borrowed tokens cannot be used for governance votes
- β Staking rewards immune to flash loan manipulation
Impact: Makes flash loan attacks economically unviable.
2. MEV & Front-Running Protection
Threat: Bots exploiting transaction ordering to extract value from users.
Protections:
- β Slippage protection on bonding curve trades
- β Deadline parameters for time-sensitive operations
- β Commit-reveal scheme for governance votes (planned)
- β Anti-sandwich attack mechanisms
Example:
// User protects against MEV
bondingCurve.buy{value: 10 ether}(
minTokens: 9500e18, // Accept max 5% slippage
deadline: block.timestamp + 300 // 5 min deadline
);3. Bonding Curve Integrity
Threat: Price manipulation via large buys/sells.
Protections:
- β Mathematical price discovery (constant function AMM)
- β Liquidity depth protection (reserve requirements)
- β Fee collection (0.3% trading fee) dampens volatility
- β Emergency circuit breakers
Curve Formula:
Price = k * Supply^2
Where:
- k = 0.0000001 (initial constant)
- Supply = circulating S360 tokens
- Ensures smooth price discoveryPrice Impact Analysis:
| Buy Amount | Price Impact | Cost (AVAX) |
|---|---|---|
| 1,000 S360 | ~0.01% | ~0.1 |
| 10,000 S360 | ~0.5% | ~12 |
| 100,000 S360 | ~8% | ~1,500 |
| 1,000,000 S360 | ~90% | ~25,000 |
Large purchases have exponentially higher costs, preventing manipulation.
4. Staking Attack Prevention
Threat: Attackers gaming staking rewards or manipulating governance weight.
Protections:
- β Minimum stake period (no instant stake-vote-unstake)
- β Withdrawal delays (prevents flash staking)
- β Reward calculation immune to manipulation
- β Emergency withdrawal available (without rewards)
Staking Economics:
- APY: 12-25% (based on total staked)
- Min Stake: 100 S360
- Cooldown: 7 days
- Early Exit: Available, forfeit rewards
5. Governance Security
Threat: Wealthy actors buying governance control.
Protections:
- β Proposal creation requires 100,000 S360 staked (masternode requirement)
- β 4% quorum requirement (51.85M S360 must vote - 4% of 1.296B total)
- β 2-day timelock minimum on all executions
- β Multi-signature veto power for emergencies (4/7 signatures β₯57% approval)
Cost of Attack: To control governance, an attacker would need:
- Acquire >50% of supply: ~648M S360 tokens (>$64.8M at $0.1 initial price)
- Stake for extended period: Tokens must be staked, locking capital and exposing to price risk
- Survive community scrutiny: All proposals are public and reviewed by community
- Bypass timelock: 2 days minimum delay for community response and organization
- Defeat multi-sig: Emergency council (4/7 signatures β₯57% approval) can veto malicious proposals
Conclusion: Economic attack on governance is prohibitively expensive (>$64.8M minimum) and has multiple layers of defense that make success extremely unlikely.
6. Treasury Protection
Threat: Draining the treasury via malicious proposals or exploits.
Protections:
- β Multi-signature control (4/7 signatures required β₯57% approval for emergency actions)
- β Spending limits enforced on-chain
- β Timelock on all withdrawals (2 days minimum)
- β Governance approval required for large expenditures
- β Emergency freeze capability
Treasury Allocation:
- Treasury Reserve: 108M S360 (8.3% of total supply)
- Initial Value: ~$10.8M USD equivalent at $0.1 price
- Governance Required: Yes, for all spending decisions
- Timelock: 2 days minimum on all withdrawals
- Purpose: Protocol development, audits, liquidity, partnerships
7. Token Supply Integrity
Threat: Unauthorized minting or burning affecting tokenomics.
Protections:
- β Hard cap: 1,296,360,012 S360 (immutable, fractal design)
- β Minting disabled after initial distribution
- β No admin mint function (eliminated in v3.2.0)
- β No burning mechanism (fixed supply forever)
Supply Distribution (14 wallets):
- Total Supply: 1,296,360,012 S360 (1.296 Billion)
- Admin Operations: 36.36M (2.8%)
- Founder: 108M (8.3%, 4yr vesting + 1yr cliff)
- Core Team: 108M (8.3%)
- Ecosystem Fund: 216M (16.7%)
- Treasury Reserve: 108M (8.3%)
- Marketing: 108M (8.3%)
- Liquidity (DEX): 108M (8.3%)
- Staking Rewards: 108M (8.3%, 365-day lock)
- Bonding Curve: 108M (8.3%, gradual release)
- DAO Governance: 108M (8.3%)
- Community: 108M (8.3%)
- Strategic Alliances: 24M (1.9%)
- R&D Innovation Labs: 24M (1.9%, 5-year lock)
Economic Attack Scenarios (All Mitigated)
β Scenario 1: Flash Loan Governance Attack
Attack: Borrow large amount of S360, vote on malicious proposal, return tokens.
Defense:
- Per-block trading limit (1.08M S360) prevents massive acquisitions
- Staking requirement means borrowed tokens can't be used for voting
- Governance requires 100K S360 staked to create proposals
- Timelock gives 2 days minimum to respond and organize counter-votes
- Emergency multisig (4/7 signatures β₯57% approval) can veto malicious proposals
Result: β Attack fails. Attacker cannot acquire enough tokens in time, and even if possible, community + multisig provides defense.
β Scenario 2: Bonding Curve Drain
Attack: Manipulate price to drain liquidity pool.
Defense:
- Mathematical pricing prevents manipulation
- Large trades have exponential price impact
- 30% reserve requirement maintains liquidity
- Slippage protection stops unfavorable trades
Result: β Attack economically unviable due to slippage.
β Scenario 3: Reward Pool Exploitation
Attack: Stake massive amounts briefly to steal rewards.
Defense:
- Rewards calculated per-second fairly
- Minimum stake period prevents gaming
- Flash staking doesn't accumulate rewards
- Emergency withdrawal available without rewards
Result: β No exploit possible, math is sound.
β Scenario 4: MEV Sandwich Attack
Attack: Front-run + back-run user's bonding curve trade.
Defense:
- User sets minimum output (slippage protection)
- Transaction deadline prevents stale execution
- Price impact limits make sandwich unprofitable
Result: β MEV bot loses gas fees, user protected.
Economic Invariants
These properties ALWAYS hold (enforced by smart contracts):
- Supply Cap:
totalSupply() == 1,296,360,012e18β (immutable, no mint/burn) - Bonding Curve Allocation:
bondingCurveSupply == 108,000,000e18β - Staking Rewards:
pendingRewards <= rewardPool.balanceβ - Fee Distribution: Trading fee = 0.3% on bonding curve β
- Governance Quorum:
votesFor + votesAgainst >= 51,854,400e18β (4% of total supply)
Economic Monitoring
Post-deployment, we monitor:
- π Bonding curve liquidity depth
- π Price volatility & manipulation attempts
- π― Staking reward sustainability
- π³οΈ Governance participation rates
- π° Treasury balance & spending
- β οΈ Anomalous transaction patterns
Alert Thresholds:
- Liquidity drop >20% in 1 hour β Alert
- Price movement >50% in 1 day β Investigation
- Large unstake (>1M S360) β Monitor
- Governance proposal with low quorum β Extend voting
Economic Security Roadmap
β Completed:
- Flash loan protection
- MEV mitigation
- Bonding curve integrity
- Governance security
- Treasury safeguards
π In Progress:
- Real-time economic monitoring dashboard
- Automated alert system
- Game theory modeling
π Planned:
- Insurance fund for edge cases (Q2 2026)
- Cross-chain economic security (Q3 2026)
- Formal economic model audit (Q2 2026)
Resources
For technical implementation details:
- Smart Contracts - Code-level protections
- Governance - Voting & proposal mechanics
- Tokenomics - Supply distribution & economics
For security audits:
- Audit History - Security review timeline
- Vulnerabilities Fixed - Specific exploits prevented